Abstract:  Millions of households across the developing world rely on migration to navigate economic uncertainty. While a substantial body of research has documented the economic and welfare implications of these labor flows for origin communities, their political consequences have received little attention. In this paper, I develop a theory of how access to private self-insurance mechanisms, such as temporary migration, can lead citizens to disengage from politics. I illustrate this argument in India, the world's largest democracy, home to an estimated 100 million internal economic migrants. To do so, I first conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of nationally representative panel data to establish that household migration reduces claim-making over the state. Next, I use original survey data from a high-migration corridor to demonstrate that members of migrant households are systematically less likely to vote or participate in political protest compared to non-migrant households. Evidence from household survey data and focus groups suggests that migrant remittances drive this disengagement effect: remittance transfers substitute for welfare services provided by the state and dampen the politicization of local grievances. These findings have important implications for democratic accountability in the Global South.