Abstract:  Millions of households across the developing world rely on migration to navigate economic uncertainty. While a substantial body of research has documented the economic and welfare implications of these labor flows for origin communities, their political consequences have received little attention. In this paper, I develop a theory of how access to private self-insurance mechanisms, such as temporary migration, can lead citizens to disengage from politics. I illustrate this argument in India, the world's largest democracy, home to an estimated 100 million internal economic migrants. To do so, I first conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of nationally representative panel data to establish that household migration reduces claim-making over the state. Next, I use original survey data from a high-migration corridor to demonstrate that members of migrant households are systematically less likely to vote or participate in political protest compared to non-migrant households. Evidence from household survey data and focus groups suggests the migrant remittances drive this disengagement effect: these financial transfers substitute for welfare services traditionally provided by the state and dampen the politicization of local grievances. These findings have important implications for political accountability and democratic governance in the Global South.