Abstract: How do political elites respond in contexts where a significant portion of the electorate migrates out? Emigration can not only reshape the preferences and behaviors of remaining electorates, but also alter the incentive structures of local politicians. Emerging literature in political economy suggests that political leaders have fewer incentives to perform when constituents can self-insure against economic uncertainty through private coping mechanisms such as migration. When a critical mass of voters relies on migration to meet basic economic and welfare needs, local leaders may face perverse incentives to reduce the provision of public services. I illustrate this argument in India, a country that is home to an estimated 100 million internal economic migrants. Using village-level panel data from India’s Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), I demonstrate that villages experiencing higher out-migration flows due to adverse shocks exhibit significant declines in the provision of local public goods and the institutional performance of gram sabhas, India’s grassroots deliberative assemblies. These findings underscore how emigration can undermine democratic accountability in developing countries.